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As a result of the consolidation of the democracy after the end of the military regime in the mid-
1980s, Brazil has gone through a period of remarkable decentralization both in fiscal and
political terms. The move towards decentralized management and control of public finances has
been followed by a series of bailouts of state governments by the federal government. The lack
of effective control on borrowing, coupled with reputational effects originating from these
repeated bailout operations, reduced fiscal discipline and created an explosive accumulation of
debts in Brazilian states during the last decade. The main purpose of this paper is to assess the
determinants of state debt bailouts in Brazil and their relationship with states’ fiscal discipline
during the 1990s. After providing a brief overview of intergovernmental fiscal relationships in
the Brazilian economy, the paper describes state debt developments from the mid-1980s on, with
special emphasis on the 1989, 1993 and 1997 state debt bailouts. Then it discusses the
determinants of state debt bailouts in Brazil along the lines of a conceptual framework which
recognizes that the essence of the bailout question is the issue of moral hazard and also presents
empirical evidence that the occurrence of bailouts is associated with lower fiscal discipline in
Brazilian states during the 1990s.ii
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As a result of the consolidation of the democracy after the end of the military regime in the mid-
1980s, Brazil has gone through a period of remarkable decentralization both in fiscal and
political terms.  The proportion of public consumption executed by state and local governments
has increased from 42 to 54 percent between 1989 and 1996.  During the same period, the share
of state and local governments in total public investment increased from 60 to 62 percent.
1
Political decentralization has been even more intense.  From 1990 to 1996 the number of
municipalities has increased from 4,491 to 5,509.  In the same period, the Brazilian federation
increased its membership from 24 to 27 states.  During the last fifteen years, therefore, state and
local governments became responsible for the execution of a larger portion of the budget, and
their autonomy with respect to fiscal decisions was decentralized significantly.
The move towards decentralized management and control of public finances has been followed
by a series of bailouts of state governments by the federal government. Counting only major
rescue operations, Brazilian states were bailed out by the federal government in 1989, 1993 and
1997.  Debt bailouts are a mechanism for states to transfer their fiscal deficits to the federal
government.  If states know that the federal government will recurrently bail them out, they will
consistently overspend.  The Brazilian experience during the last decade offers a clear example
of this association between debt bailouts by the federal government and fiscal discipline in states.
During the period through which the bailouts were extended, there was a considerable
deterioration in the states fiscal performance.  In fact, the states became a major factor in the
observed decline in the public sector primary balance after the introduction of the Real Plan in
mid-1994.
2
This study presents a systematic evaluation of the determinants of state debt bailouts in Brazil
and examines their relationship with states’ fiscal discipline during the 1990s.  It is structured as
follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of intergovernmental fiscal relationships in the
Brazilian economy, in order to provide a background for the other parts of the study.  In Chapter
3, a description of state debt developments during 1985 to 1994 is presented, with special
emphasis on the 1989 and 1993 comprehensive state debt bailouts.  Chapter 4 describes state
debt developments during the period of the Real Plan.  It presents a detailed analysis of the fiscal
crisis in the Brazilian states in the post-stabilization period and examines the developments that
led to the 1997 bailout.  Chapter 5 assesses the determinants of state debt bailouts in Brazil along
the lines of a framework, which recognizes that the essence of the bailout question is the issue of
moral hazard.  In addition, it presents the results of an econometric analysis of the relationship of
bailouts and fiscal discipline in Brazilian states.  Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the study
discussing some of its policy implications.
                                                       
1 The figures refer only to the general government.  See Bevilaqua and Werneck (1998), Appendix 1.
2 See Bevilaqua and Werneck (1998)2
2. Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Brazil 
3
The Brazilian federation encompasses three levels of government: the federal government, 27
states (including the Federal District) and 5509 municipalities.  The states are divided into five
geographical regions.  The South region is formed by the states of Paraná, Santa Catarina and
Rio Grande do Sul.  Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo are the states in
the Southeast region.  The sparsely populated Midwest region comprises the states of Goiás,
Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and the Federal District.  The North region consists of Acre,
Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins.  Finally, the Northeast includes the
states of Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte e
Sergipe.
The five regions are characterized by major disparities among them.  The states in the South and
Southeast regions accounted in 1997 for about 58 percent of the country’s population and some
76 percent of the national GDP.  Per capita income ranged from about R$1,400-1,600 a year in
Maranhão and Piauí, in the poorest Northeast region, to almost R$9,000 in São Paulo and more
than R$10,000 a year in the Distrito Federal.  At the regional level, per capita income in the
richest Southeast region is about three times the per capita income of the poorest Northeast
region (Table 1).
Social indicators also show considerable variation. Infant mortality in 1998 ranged from 17 per
thousand in the South region to 48 per thousand in the Northeast region.  Life expectancy at birth
went from 60 years in the Northeast to more than 70 years in the South. The illiteracy rate varied
from almost 30 percent in the Northeast to less than 10 percent in the South and Southeast. The
average number of school years in 1996 ranged from 3.8 in the Northeast to 6.5 in the
Southeast.
4
In order to provide a background for the discussion of the bailout problem and its relationship
with current fiscal difficulties in Brazil, this chapter briefly examines some key characteristics of
the Brazilian federation: the assignment of revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities to
the federal, state and municipal governments, and the regulation of subnational government
borrowing.
2.1 Tax Assignment
During the last decades, intergovernmental fiscal relations in Brazil have been regulated by the
1967 and 1988 Tax Reforms, which differ fundamentally with respect to the degree of
decentralization promoted.  The 1967 Reform, enacted under the military regime, concentrated
the assignment of revenue sources at the federal level and introduced a system of revenue
transfers to states and municipalities, designed to correct major disparities among the Brazilian
regions.  Conversely, the 1988 Reform extended the assignment of revenue sources to states and
municipalities, at the expense of the federal government, and strengthened the system of
intergovernmental transfers.
                                                       
3 Most of the discussion in this chapter follows Bevilaqua and Blanco (1999).
4 Atlas da Desigualdade do Brasil, IPEA/DIPES, 1998.3
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 Acre         1,303        500   2,605
 Alagoas         5,711      2,663   2,145
 Amapá         1,514         402   3,767
 Amazonas        14,311       2,461   5,816
 Bahia       36,735     12,710   2,890
 Ceará       17,454      6,920   2,522
 Distrito Federal       19,723      1,877 10,508
 Espírito Santo      16,088      2,853   5,639
 Goiás      15,906      4,640   3,428
 Maranhão        7,353      5,295   1,389
 Mato Grosso        9,086      2,288   3,972
 Mato Grosso do Sul        9,219       1,965   4,693
 Minas Gerais      86,527     16,905   5,118
 Pará      14,600       5,651   2,584
 Paraíba        6,936       3,332   2,082
 Paraná      52,438       9,142   5,736
 Pernambuco      23,261       7,467   3,115
 Piauí        4,193       2,696   1,555
 Rio de Janeiro      96,947     13,556   7,152
 Rio Grande do Norte        6,618       2,594   2,551
 Rio Grande do Sul      68,689       9,762   7,036
 Rondônia       4,165       1,255   3,317
 Roraima          617          255   2,423
 Santa Catarina     31,634      4,958   6,380
 São Paulo   306,569     34,752   8,822
 Sergipe      4,805       1,657   2,900
 Tocantins      1,707      1,081   1,580
TOTAL 864,112 159,636   5,413
 Memorandum items:
 Mid-West Region    53,935   10,769   5,008
 North Region    38,217   11,604   3,293
 Northeast Region 113,067   45,334   2,494
 South Region 152,761   23,863   6,402
 Southeast Region 506,131   68,066   7,436
Source: IBGE, Contas Regionais do Brasil (1985-1997).
* At Current Prices.4
Under the current system, the federal government is assigned federal and corporate income taxes
(IR), a value-added type of tax on industrial products (IPI), a tax on rural property (ITR), social
contributions levied on payroll or turnover of enterprises, taxes on foreign trade and taxes on
financial transactions.  Both the IR and the IPI are shared with states and municipalities through
the State Participation Fund (FPE) and Municipal Participation Fund (FPM).  The ITR is shared
only with the municipalities.  The remaining taxes are not shared with either states or
municipalities.  The states are assigned a broad based value added tax (ICMS), a motor vehicle
registration tax (IPVA) and inheritance and gift taxes.  The ICMS and the IPVA are shared with
the municipalities.  Finally, the municipalities are assigned a tax on services (ISS), an urban
property tax (IPTU) and a tax on property transfers. Revenue sharing agreements have been
established by the 1988 Constitution, with coefficients that are primarily based on redistributive
criteria.  A major result of the 1988 Reform was the increase in the revenues at the disposal of all
government levels.  The relative importance of this increase was higher for subnational
governments than for the federal government. As it is shown in the Appendix, the higher
disposable revenues of subnational governments were based both on higher own revenues and
higher transfers from the federal government.
2.2 Expenditure Assignment
The 1988 Constitution identifies three separate levels of government in the Brazilian federation
(federal, state and municipal) and describes their responsibilities.  The federal government is
solely assigned a few conventional functions such as defense, foreign affairs, immigration issues,
and regulation of international trade and financial matters (Table 2).  For most of the functions,
however, the responsibility is assigned to more than one level of government, leading to
problems in service delivery.  In education, for example, the federal government has the
responsibility for setting guidelines for national education, while state governments are
responsible for the delivery of the services.  Pre-school and elementary education, however, are
responsibility of municipal governments.  In practice, the federal government still follows a pre-
1988 Constitution tradition and continues to have a direct involvement in the delivery of
education services at different levels.
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2.3 Debt Regulation
Starting with the 1967 Constitution, the senate has the authority to regulate all public sector
borrowing in Brazil.  It sets guidelines for subnational borrowing based on the amounts of
existing debt, revenues and debt service. However, it has the power to grant exceptions to these
guidelines and it usually does so.
6  The Central Bank imposes a number of regulations on the
access of states to different credit sources.  External borrowing by the states is subject to
regulation only when it requires a federal guarantee.  Under the 1988 Constitution, any
legislation on debt renegotiation or financial rescue to subnational governments can only be
initiated by the president.  After the initiative is taken, however, a financial rescue operation such
as a debt bailout can only be implemented if it has been authorized  by the senate.
7
                                                       
5 Public education at the university level,  for example, is a service delivered mainly by the federal government.
6 The typical career path in Brazilian politics is one in which the majority of the senators are either former or future state governors.  That creates
a clear conflict of interest on state debt regulation issues.
7 In practice, however, the senate can induce the federal government to initiate legislation in areas in which it has the exclusive right by creating





Policy  and Control
 Responsibility for
Provision
 Defense Federal Federal
 Foreign affairs Federal Federal
 Foreign trade Federal Federal
 Monetary and financial policies Federal Federal
 Social security Federal Federal, State
 Sectoral policies Federal, State Federal, State
 Immigration Federal Federal
 Railroads and airports Federal Federal, State
 Natural resources Federal Federal, State
 Environmental protection Federal, State Federal, State
 Education Federal, State, Municipal Federal, State, Municipal
 Health Federal, State Federal, State, Municipal
 Social assistance Federal, State Federal, State, Municipal
 Police Federal, State Federal, State, Municipal
 Water and sewerage Federal State, Municipal
 Fire protection Federal, State State
 Parks and recreation Municipal Municipal
 Roads
     National Federal Federal
     State State State
     Interstate Federal Federal, State
     Local State Municipal
    Source: Afonso and Ramundo (1996), quoted  in Ter-Minassian (1997).
3. State Government Debt during the High Inflation Years 
8
Before the mid-1960s, states’ financing needs were usually fulfilled with loans from federal
government agencies or foreign sources.
9  With the implementation of the financial reforms of
1964/65 
10, when the monetary correction of contracts was formally introduced in the Brazilian
financial system, an important market was created for public bonds, including those of the state
governments.  However, the opening of international capital markets to developing countries in
the late 1960s made foreign financing a preferred option for the financing of the Brazilian public
sector.  States’ recourse to external funds was actually encouraged by the federal government
during the early 1980s due to the need to finance a soaring external current account deficit.  The
easy access to external credit, combined with loose controls on domestic borrowing, made the
1970s a decade of rapid growth of state governments’ debt.
                                                       
8 This section is based on Bevilaqua and Rangel (1999).
9 From its creation in 1952 to 1964, the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE) was a major source of funds for the Brazilian states.
Foreign financing became important again by the end of the 1960s.  See Jayme Jr. (1994) and Rezende (1982).
10 See Sochaczewski (1980) for details of the 1964/65 Financial Reform.6
The crisis generated by the interruption in external credit after the Mexican moratorium in 1982
forced the federal government to restrain states’ access to financing sources.  The reduced access
to formal sources, however, did not produce the required improvement in states’ fiscal
performance and their financing needs were ultimately met with exceptional financing from the
federal government.  This chapter examines the evolution of states’ debt from the end of the
military regime in early 1985 to the launching of the Real Plan in 1994. This period was
characterized by fiscal decentralization and political autonomy for subnational governments.  It
was also characterized by recurrent crises in states’ debt.  The chapter starts by examining the
developments before the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, and then describes the
comprehensive debt restructuring episodes that took place in 1989 and 1993.
3.1 The period before the 1988 Constitution
As a result of the developments in international capital markets in the wake of the Mexican
crisis, the Brazilian government resorted to the assistance of the International Monetary Fund. In
the context of the reduction in net domestic credit required by the IMF supported program,
Central Bank Resolution 831 (see Box 1) introduced formal limits to the amount of credit
extended by the domestic financial system to state governments. The limits, however, referred to
new debt.  The rollover of existing debt, in many cases covering interest payments, was routine,
especially with state owned banks.  In any event, the combination of credit limits, higher tax
revenues produced by the economic recovery after 1984, and the effect of the accelerating
inflation rate on the real value of government expenditures, reduced the growth of subnational
government debt.
11 By 1985, the net debt of states and municipalities corresponded to 6.9
percent of GDP, or about 13.4 percent of the net debt of the consolidated public sector.
12  More
than two thirds of this amount referred to net domestic debt (Table 3).
The remarkable reduction in the inflation rate produced under the Cruzado Plan in 1986
coincided with the first general elections in the country after the end of the military regime.
13
Without being able to rely on the high inflation rates to restrain real expenditure growth as in the
past, the states were submitted to important budgetary pressures.
 14 After the 1986 elections, the
political attention was mainly focussed on the preparation of the new federal constitution, which
was the primary task of the recently elected congress.  At the federal level, however, the main
focus was on President Sarney’s crusade to have an additional year for his presidential term. The
1986 elections provided a single political party (PMDB) with the majority of the seats in the
senate (78 percent), in the chamber of deputies (53 percent) and in state governments (22 of the
23 states).  The same party had also secured the majority of the state capitals (76 percent) in the
1985 municipal elections.  These results favored a strong coalition of subnational interests in the
preparation of the new constitution, at a time when the federal government’s attention was
directed to a different objective.  Not surprisingly, the new constitution was characterized by a
significant degree of fiscal decentralization and political autonomy for subnational governments.
                                                       
11 See Furuguem et al. (1996).
12 Central Bank net debt statistics present only consolidated information for both state and municipal governments.
13 See Modiano (1988) for a description of the Cruzado Plan.
14 In an effort to prevent a further increase in spending, which could compromise the stabilization program, Central Bank Resolution 1135
prohibited state governments borrowing from their own banks.  The Resolution also prohibited the so called “triangular operations” through
which state suppliers and contractors borrowed from state banks with state government guarantee. Latter on, and in agreement with state
governments, they defaulted on these loans leaving the state banks with bad loans which the state government ended up assuming.  As with other
borrowing controls, those restrictions were often evaded.  See Afonso and Rezende (1988).7
In the fiscal area, the states demanded greater budgetary autonomy and the revision of their debt
contracts.  While the new constitution was not promulgated, they requested financial aid from the
federal government, which was extended through a series of measures implemented during 1987
(see Box 1).
15
The 1988 Constitution created a budgetary regime in which states’ spending responsibilities were
increased and revenues were kept relatively constant.  That structure was only manageable in a
context of high inflation rates and strong control of state borrowing.  While inflation remained
high for many years, borrowing restrictions were frequently evaded.  As a result, the net debt of
subnational governments, which had remained fairly stable as a share of GDP during the second
half of the 1980s, would increase significantly during the early 1990s.
3.2 The 1989 Bailout and the Increase in Bond Financing
After the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, in October 1988, the federal government tried
to address the state debt problem through a combination of restrictions on new borrowing and
relief on the burden of the existing debt.
16  Comprehensive debt relief was finally extended
through Law 7976, of December 1989.  The federal government formally assumed the external
debt of the states with maturities higher than one year and contracted up to December 1988.  The
debt was then refinanced with an equal liability in domestic currency with 20 years maturity with
a 5 years grace period. In addition, the refinancing involved states’ debt with the federal
government arising from the rollover of the original external debt contracts.  The interest rate on
the refinanced debt was the same rate paid by the federal government on its external debt, plus
monetary correction.  The total amount refinanced was about R$ 10.5 billion, at December 1998
prices, or some 20 percent of states’ revenues in 1989. Article 4 of Law 7976 established that all
improvements in debt service terms obtained by the Federal Government would be extended to
subnational governments.
As Table 4 indicates, the 1989 bailout was more concentrated in the Southeastern states, which
accounted for a little less than half of the refinanced debt.  As a share of states’ GDP, however,
the bailout was more important for the states in the Northeast region.  In the case of Ceará, for
example, the bailout was equivalent to more than 6 percent of local GDP.
                                                       
15 The most important measure was Law 7614, which granted states and municipalities direct credit from the Federal Treasury, through Banco do
Brasil.  Those credits, which, under the discretion of the Ministry of Finance, could be replaced by the issuing of state bonds, were directed
towards financing current account deficits and the service of debts incurred before April 1987.  The credit lines had a maturity of four years for
the direct administration and 15 years for financial institutions, and in both cases a 18 months grace period was given.
16 Senate Resolution 94/89 altered substantially the criteria for borrowing restraint, introducing limits on borrowing capacity and debt service
instead of the usual restrictions on the amount of debt outstanding.  Central Bank Resolution 1469, in turn, froze the amount of credit from
financial institutions to the nonfinancial public sector, in real terms, at 1987 levels.  It also implemented the rollover of subnational governments
external debt through bridge loans from the federal government or through direct relending from the external creditors.8
Box 1
Subnational Government Borrowing and Debt Regulation, 1975 - 1994
Date Law Description
October 1975 Senate Resolution # 62 Limits debt to 70% of previews year’s Revenue;
October 1976 Senate Resolution # 93 Limits debt service;
May 1979 Central Bank Resolution # 539 Limits bonds to 50% of total debt; limits debt service to 15% of previews
year’s Fiscal Surplus; limits debt growth to 20% of previews year’s Revenue;
June 1983 Central Bank Resolution # 831 Limits credit supply from private financial institutions;
June 1985 Senate Resolution # 64 Changes the previews year’s revenue indexation criteria;
May 1986 Central Bank Resolution # 1135 Forbids credit operations from financial institutions to its owners;
April 1987 Central Bank Resolution # 1309 Special credit line to banks that would refinance Sub-National Governments;
June 1987 Senate Resolution # 87 Temporary indebtedness limit extension (Senate Resolution 62/1975).
August 1987 Law 7614 Credit operations from National Treasury to subnational governments.
October 1988 Federal Constitution
December 1988 Central Bank Resolution # 1469 Extends limit on external debt roll over;
December 1989 Senate Resolution # 94 Limits credit operations to 10% of net revenue; limits Revenue Anticipation
Loans to 25% of  net revenue;
December 1989 Law 7976 Federal Government External Debt Bailout
December 1990 Senate Resolution # 58 Limits credit operations to 20% of net revenue; limits Revenue Anticipation
Loans to 15% of net revenue;
February 1991 Central Bank Resolution # 1789 Bond Exchange procedure;
October 1991 Central Bank Vote # 2062 Creation of mutual funds based on subnational treasury bonds;
December 1991 Law 8388 Federal Government Debt Bailout (not implemented)
June 1992 Senate Resolution # 36 Limits debt service to 15% of real net revenues;
March 1993 Constitutional Amendement Forbids bonds issues until Dec-1999 (except precatórios)
July 1993 Central Bank Resolution # 2008 Limits commercial banks’ credit and debt roll over;
November 1993 Senate Resolution # 96 Extends external credit conditions (obtained by Federal Government) for
subnational governments  external debt.
November 1993 Law 8727 Federal Government Debt Bailout
January 1994 Senate Resolution # 11 Bond Exchange procedure;
June 1994 Central Bank Resolution # 2081 Forbids Budgetary Revenue Anticipation Loans during election years9
Table 3
Subnational Net Debt
(in percent of GDP)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1. Total Net Debt 
(1) 6.90 6.30 6.82 5.57 6.15 8.87 7.50 9.50 9.30 9.50
 1.1. Domestic Debt 4.90 4.60 5.23 4.18 5.18 7.67 6.40 8.40 8.30 9.20
  1.1.1. Bonded Domestic Net Debt
 (2) - - 1.81 1.53 2.49 2.46 2.30 3.10 3.60 4.60
    a) Issued Bonds - - 0.00 1.53 2.49 2.49 2.50 3.40 3.70 4.70
     a.1) Bonds outside Central Bank - - 1.81 0.00 0.00 1.65 1.90 3.40 3.70 2.00
     a.2) Bonds in Central Bank - - - - - 0.83 0.60 0.00 0.00 2.70
    b) Securities in treasury - - - - - 0.03 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.10
  1.1.2. Banks - - 3.41 2.65 2.69 4.45 3.20 4.30 3.90 3.30
  1.1.3. Revenue to be collected - - - - - -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  1.1.4. Demand Deposits - - - - - -0.36 -0.30 -0.20 -0.20 -0.30
  1.1.5. Aviso MF-30 and others - - - - - 1.16 1.20 1.10 0.90 0.60
  1.1.6. Federal Gov.Renegotiation - - - - - - - - - 1.10
 1.2. External Debt 2.00 1.70 1.60 1.40 0.97 1.20 1.20 1.10 1.00 0.30
Sources: Debt Data: Brasil Programa Econômico (from 85 to 89); Relatório do Banco Central do Brasil (90) and Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil (from 91 to 94).
GDP Data: IBGE (from 85 to 90) and Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil (from 91 to 94).
(1) Excludes subnational public enterprises.
(2) Bond issued minus securities in treasury.
Note: "-" means N/A.10
Table 4











 Share in Total
Amount
Renegotiated
 Acre       10.98 0.87%      27.52   0.1%
 Alagoas     112.57 2.26%     46.36   1.1%
 Amapá   - -   - -
 Amazonas       27.65 0.28%     13.87   0.3%
 Bahia    564.46 1.65%     49.18   5.4%
 Ceará    786.08 6.42%   126.95   7.5%
 Distrito Federal   - -   - -
 Espírito Santo      95.99 0.85%     38.29   0.9%
 Goiás    619.60 4.37%  159.96   5.9%
 Maranhão    335.65 4.09%     70.23   3.2%
 Mato Grosso    363.77 4.93%   193.15   3.5%
 Mato Grosso do Sul    323.73 4.23%   188.90   3.1%
 Minas Gerais    226.31 0.34%     14.73   2.2%
 Pará      37.01 0.25%       7.87   0.4%
 Paraíba    177.04 3.68%    56.54   1.7%
 Paraná      66.58 0.17%      8.01   0.6%
 Pernambuco    239.48 1.28%    34.37   2.3%
 Piauí    107.62 3.60%    42.87   1.0%
 Rio de Janeiro    947.90 0.86%    75.46   9.0%
 Rio Grande do Norte      95.13 1.33%    40.80   0.9%
 Rio Grande do Sul    721.73 1.39%    80.93   6.9%
 Rondônia        3.54 0.11%     3.44   0.0%
 Roraima    -  -    -  -
 Santa Catarina    649.24 2.87%  147.76   6.2%
 São Paulo  3,970.97 1.45%  130.07 37.8%
 Sergipe      26.33 0.54%  18.35   0.3%
 Tocantins - - - -
TOTAL 10,509.83 1.38%   73.85 100.0%
 Memorandum items:
 Mid-West Region  1,307.10 2.30%  145.18 12.4%
 North Region      79.18 0.25%      8.37    0.8%
 Northeast Region  2,444.84 2.49%    59.26 23.3%
 South Region  1,437.54 1.26%    66.47 13.7%
 Southeast Region  5,241.17 1.14%    85.98 49.9%
 Sources: Gazeta Mercantil and Central Bank of Brazil..
  Note: Bailout Amounts inflated by Centered IGP-DI end of year; while GDP inflated by IGP-DI  year average.
* Renegotiated Amounts in Constant December 1998 Prices11
Between the final months of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 the Brazilian economy went
through a period of intense macroeconomic instability.  In February 1990, a month before the
inauguration of the Collor administration, the monthly inflation rate reached 80 percent.  The
new administration implemented a stabilization program that resulted in a sharp contraction in
economic activity.  Without the help of high inflation rates to reduce real expenditures and faced
with lower revenues because of the virtual stagnation in real GDP, the states demanded a new
round of debt renegotiation with the federal government.  Law 8388, of December 1991,
established the conditions for the refinancing of debts with the federal government, contracted
during the 1980s after the access to foreign credit was interrupted, and states bonds.  The federal
government would assume those debts and refinance them in 20 years, with quarterly payments.
A three month grace period would be given to the states and the yearly interest rate on the
refinanced debt would be 6 percent plus monetary correction.
This new round of debt renegotiation, however, was not implemented.  The acceleration of the
inflation rate following the breakdown of the second Collor Plan in mid 1991 contributed to a
weaker demand for renegotiation from states.  In addition, two policy measures during the year
provided states with some financial relief.  Central Bank Resolution 1789, of February 1991,
allowed the exchange of Central Bank Bonds for state bonds, facilitating the rollover of state
debts in the domestic financial markets.  Finally, in October 1991, the Central Bank authorized
the operation of mutual funds with state and municipal bonds in their portfolios, substantially
increasing the demand for states debt.  As a result, bonds became the main source of financing
for the Brazilian states and the main source of increase of subnational government net debt
during the first half of the 1990s.
3.3 The 1993 Bailout and the 1994 Bond Exchange
Between 1991 and 1993, the net debt of state and municipal governments increased from 7.5
percent to 9.3 percent of GDP.  More than 70 percent of this increase is explained by the growth
in the net bonded debt (Table 3).  During this period, the real rate of growth of states’ bonded
debt was of  40 percent (Table 5 and Figure 1).  Given these high rates of growth, this  form of
debt became  an important source of concern
17 and ended up motivating Constitutional
Amendment No.3, introduced during the revision of the 1988 Constitution in 1993.  This
legislation forbids the issuance of new bonds by the states until December 1999, except for the
payment of judicial claims existing at the time of the 1988 Constitution.
18
                                                       
17 See World Bank (1995).
18 The Constitutional Amendment, however, did not prohibit rollover operations of existing bonds, which are determined by the senate on a case-
by-case basis and are normally interpreted as comprising  both the amount of principal and the capitalization of interest on existing bonds.12
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    Bonded Debt, 1986-1994












Alagoas - - - - - - - - -
Bahia 388.90 350.14 291.61 365.09 319.24 314.33 375.45 383.75 519.38 -6.2% 12.9% 1.0%
Ceará           22.11          51.87          39.02          43.72          42.24          45.07          51.64          55.03           68.52 -7.2% 12.9% 0.4%
Espírito Santo           43.29          41.78          44.55          59.60          52.98          54.87          65.02          66.99           86.33 -0.5% 13.0% 4.7%
Goiás           13.19            5.38            4.33            0.27        250.16        266.02        345.53        358.70        491.97 18.4% 35.2%
Mato Grosso                  -                  -                  -                  -          67.06          71.55          90.11          91.94         126.08 17.1%
Mato Grosso do
Sul
                 -                  -                  -                  -                  -                  -        131.15        139.76         191.85
Minas Gerais      2,072.69    2,525.01     2,355.73     3,472.60     3,065.07     3,289.55     4,400.32     4,571.12     6,174.95 14.6% 19.1% 16.4%
Paraíba           47.75          69.79          52.90          71.82          46.78          20.08          26.14          93.11          38.37 -10.2% -4.8% -8.1%
Paraná           19.70          18.27          13.74            0.81        142.67        152.22        198.16        208.00         275.45 17.9%
Pernambuco - - - - - - - - -
Piauí           12.45          12.19          16.49            0.54            1.49                  -                  -                  -                  -
Rio de Janeiro      1,762.76     2,416.90     1,804.79     2,733.87     2,618.85     2,606.65     3,141.50     3,158.36     4,209.82 11.9% 12.6% 12.2%
Rio Grande do
Norte
          58.72          55.26          41.98          57.43          75.01          59.44          63.11          97.20                  - 6.9%
Rio Grande do
Sul
     1,617.64     2,080.17     1,572.30     2,343.80     2,533.72     2,595.10     3,243.08     3,369.91     4,571.60 8.6% 15.9% 11.5%
Santa Catarina         348.95        356.46        272.39        371.20        328.95        327.27        398.83        425.02         579.67 -5.5% 15.2% 2.3%
São Paulo     4,341.77    4,873.06    3,692.56     5,613.29     5,787.20     5,843.81     8,611.37     8,845.90   13,087.16 12.0% 22.6% 16.2%
Sergipe                  -                  -                  -                  -                  -                  -                  -                  -         138.41
TOTAL    10,749.92   12,856.27   10,202.39   15,134.05   15,331.44   15,645.96   21,141.41   21,864.80   30,559.54 10.6% 18.8% 13.8%
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil and ANDIMA13
Figure 1 
State Bonds 
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Faced with new credit difficulties, the states opened again a discussion about debt renegotiation
with the federal government.
19  The conditions for the new renegotiation were established by
Law 8727, of November 1993.  Except for states’ bonds, which were not included in the
renegotiation this time, the conditions were very similar to the renegotiation proposed in 1991.  It
involved all the debt contracted with the federal government, through federal financial
institutions, by state governments and their enterprises.  The debts, which the states had stopped
servicing, were refinanced in 20 years, without any grace period, with an interest rate equivalent
to the weighted average of the original contracts, estimated at 6.5 percent, plus monetary
correction. The total amount refinanced was about R$ 39.4 billion, at December 1998 prices.
As Table 6 shows, the 1993 bailout was more concentrated in the states of the Southeast region,
which were responsible for about 35 percent of the total amount refinanced.  For the states of the
Northeast region, however, the bailout was again more significant as a proportion of local GDP.
That was a reflection of the fact that the states in those regions were the  ones  where bonds, that
were not included in the renegotiation, were not an important form of deficit finance during this
period.
20
Since 1992 the states were facing increasing difficulties for the placement of their bonds with the
private financial institutions.  As a result, the state owned banks, which normally were the
underwriters of the debt, ended up with unmarketable bonds in their portfolios.  With the practice
by the states of forcing their banks to rollover the entire amount of debt service by capitalizing
interest payments, some of the largest state banks faced increasing liquidity problems.  In order
to prevent a widespread financial crises, the federal government authorized the temporary
swapping of unmarketable state banks for central bank bonds.
Central Bank Resolution 2081, of June 1994, established the basis for the bond exchange which
converted the central bank into the main holder of the state bonds.  While in the end of 1993 the
central bank was not holding any state bonds, one year later it was the main holder of the R$
30.6 billions
21 of state bonds in circulation.  The original bond exchange proposal determined
that the savings from the difference in the spread between the state bonds and the central bank
bonds would be used for the redemption of the former.  However, the federal government ended
up allowing the states to use the resources for debt service and for the capitalization of their
banks. In addition, in early 1995 the senate authorized the rollover of the entire amount of
maturing bonds as well as the capitalization of all interest payments on it.
The bond exchange, however, was not enough to prevent the default of the two largest states,
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, on loans to their state banks, BANESPA and BANERJ.  In both
cases, the loans to the state governments were the main “assets” of the banks.  With those non-
performing loans, the state banks resorted increasingly during the second half of 1994 to short-
term liquidity assistance from the Central Bank which decided to place BANESPA and BANERJ
under intervention on December 31, 1994.
                                                       
19 The composition of the senate at the time was conducive to the renegotiation: many of the senators during the 1990-1994 legislature were
former state governors or became state governors in 1995.  A consensus rapidly emerged on the need for debt renegotiation and for the revision
of the existing criteria for states borrowing control.
20 See also Almeida (1996).
21 At December 1998 prices.15
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 Acre     430.34 32.35%       983.65     1.09%
 Alagoas    817.14 23.59%       313.75     2.07%
 Amapá - -    -  -
 Amazonas  1,312.07 17.43%       591.66     3.33%
 Bahia  3,585.88 13.82%       292.06     9.09%
 Ceará    942.23   9.81%       143.86     2.39%
 Distrito Federal  - -    -  -
 Espírito Santo     599.42   6.47%       222.11     1.52%
 Goiás  3,194.12 27.30%       765.70     8.10%
 Maranhão  1,750.17 32.36%       343.92     4.44%
 Mato Grosso  1,725.58 31.75%       792.20     4.37%
 Mato Grosso do Sul  1,096.73 16.54%       592.77     2.78%
 Minas Gerais  2,387.96   4.69%       147.91     6.05%
 Pará     650.77   5.56%       124.84     1.65%
 Paraíba  1,180.42 28.01%       360.51     2.99%
 Paraná  1,445.32   4.37%       168.30     3.66%
 Pernambuco  1,628.90 12.49%       223.29     4.13%
 Piauí     985.00 38.67%       370.66     2.50%
 Rio de Janeiro  1,903.49   3.17%       145.69     4.83%
 Rio Grande do Norte    714.23 14.45%       285.29     1.81%
 Rio Grande do Sul  2,507.47   6.21%       267.59     6.36%
 Rondônia     228.09   6.93%       183.70     0.58%
 Roraima       58.77   9.65%       243.75     0.15%
 Santa Catarina     635.85   3.57%       135.36     1.61%
 São Paulo  8,936.77   4.55%       273.28    22.66%
 Sergipe     632.83 15.64%       407.86     1.60%
 Tocantins        93.02 11.14%         95.87     0.24%
 TOTAL 39,442.57   7.24%       260.22 100.00%
 Memorandum items:
 Mid-West Region    6,016.43 16.29%       609.38   15.25%
 North Region     2,773.07 10.54%       260.88     7.03%
 Northeast Region  12,236.80 16.71%       279.36   31.02%
 South Region    4,588.63   5.03%       202.54   11.63%
 Southeast Region 13,827.64   4.37%       214.02   35.06%
 Sources: Gazeta Mercantil and Central Bank of Brazil.
  Note: Bailouts Amounts inflated by Centered IGP-DI end of year; while GDP inflated by IGP-DI year average.
* Renegotiated Amounts in Constant December 1998 Prices16
The 1994 bond exchange and the measures that followed it launched the process of federalization
of state bonded debt which was concluded with the 1997 renegotiation.  They also eliminated the
fiscal discipline that financial markets were imposing on the states by refusing to hold their
bonds.  As the next chapter will indicate, the elimination of fiscal discipline was also an
important determinant of the deterioration in states’ financial performance after the introduction
of the Real Plan.
4. State Government Debt during the Real Plan
Most Brazilian states started to have serious fiscal difficulties in 1995. Those difficulties can be
traced back to their sluggishness to adjust to the new low inflation environment and to the fact
that their finances were severely hit by the very high real interest rates maintained during most of
1995.  In response to the states’ fiscal crisis, the federal government started in 1996 debt
restructuring plans, in conjunction with fiscal adjustment programs which were eventually
consolidated by Law 9496 of September 1997.  Those plans involved a comprehensive
restructuring of the state debt, with both an up-front debt forgiveness and an interest rate subsidy
on the restructured debt.  In most cases, the debt has been restructured for 30 years with an
annual interest rate of 6 percent, plus monetary correction.
This chapter examines the evolution of state government debt from 1994 to 1998.  It starts with
an analysis of the fiscal crisis in the states in the period immediately after the introduction of the
Real Plan.  Then, it describes the developments that led to the 1997 comprehensive debt bailout.
4.1 The Post-Real Plan Fiscal Crisis in the States
With the stabilization of the economy after July 1994, the Brazilian public sector had to face a
substantially different budgetary regime.  It was no longer possible to rely on the inflation rate to
reduce the real value of public expenditures and, at the inflation rates prevailing after 1994, the
primary budget surpluses observed in the years before the introduction of the Real Plan virtually
disappeared. The sudden end of the high inflation regime laid open the inconsistency between
expenditures and revenues generated by the 1988 constitutional reform.  The major source of this
inconsistency was the rigidity in the spending side associated with payroll and social security
expenditures under the new constitution.  Even in a context of rapidly growing revenues, as the
1990s have been, such rigidity implied a adverse structural trend for the primary balances.
22
The adverse effects of the stabilization on the states’ fiscal accounts were intensified by two
other factors.  First, the nominal wage increases granted to public employees in the last semester
of the Itamar Franco administration (8 percent increase in the minimum wage in September
1994) and first semester of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s term (43 percent increase in the
minimum wage in May 1995).  Those increases followed a common practice in the public
administration of granting employees nominal wage increases in line with past inflation levels.
As the inflation rate accelerated, the real value of those payments was eroded and the nominal
wage increase ended up fitting in the budget.  With the stabilization, those nominal wage
increases represented a large expansion in real payroll expenditures.  As Table 7 indicates, state
                                                       
22 The effect of the inflation rate on the budget is described in Bacha (1994).  See Bevilaqua and Werneck (1998) for empirical evidence of this
effect and for an analysis of the fiscal consequences of the 1988 Constitution.17
payroll expenditures increased from an average of 52.1 percent of net revenues during 1989-
1994 to an average of 69.8 percent in 1995-1997.  For the states of the south region, payroll
expenditures reached an average of almost 80 percent of net revenues during 1995-1997.
Table 7
State Payroll Expenditures, 1984-1997
*
(In percent of net revenues)
Region 1984/1988 1989/1994 1995/1997
Mid-West 43.4 46.6 71.2
North 61.5 55.1 57.8
Northeast 52.2 49.5 69.5
South 61.2 56.9 77.1
Southeast 52.0 52.4 73.6
BRAZIL 54.1 52.1 69.8
*Wages and pensions; average values for the different sub-periods
Source: Boletim Estatístico de Pessoal - MOG/SEAP.
The second factor was the monetary policy adopted in the period following the implementation
of the Real Plan.  Given the sharp deterioration of the consolidated public sector accounts in
1995 
23, the demand boom that followed the launching of the stabilization plan in mid-1994
could only be halted with very high interest rates.  As Figure 2 shows, real interest rates were
consistently above 30 percent a year during 1995.  The effect of the rise in scheduled interest
payments resulting from the high interest rates was compounded by the end of the five years
grace period for the 1989 debt renegotiation in December 1994.  Given that a large proportion of
the nonrenegotiated state debts was contracted at variable rates, the standard practice of
capitalization of interest due implied an explosive debt path (Dillinger, 1997).  As Table 8
shows, from 1994 to 1996 the net debt of the state and municipal governments increased from
9.5 to 11.9 percent of GDP.  A large portion of this increase is associated with state bonds, which
grew from 5.2 percent of GDP to 6.6 percent of  GDP during the same period (Table 9 and
Figure 3).
As a result of those factors, many states started to have cash flow problems and had to rely more
heavily on short-term revenue anticipation loans (AROs) at market interest rates.  Throughout
1995, arrears were incurred to suppliers, public employees and on loans to state-owned banks.
At the end of the year, as the AROs were falling due and thirteenth salary and holiday payments
had to be disbursed, a severe fiscal crisis emerged in the states.
                                                       
23 See Bevilaqua and Werneck (1998).18
Figure 2 
Annualized Monthly Real Interest Rate 


























































































































(in percent of GDP)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1. Total Net Debt 
(1) 9.50 10.40 11.90 13.00 14.30
 1.1. Domestic Debt 9.20 10.10 11.50 12.50 13.70
  1.1.1. Bonded Domestic Net Debt
 (2) 4.60 5.40 6.40 4.30 2.40
    a) Bonds Issued 4.70 5.70 6.60  -  -
     a.1) Bonds outside Central Bank 2.00 2.00 2.40  -  -
     a.2) Bonds in Central Bank 2.70 3.70 4.20  -  -
    b) Securities in treasury 0.10 0.30 0.20  -  -
  1.1.2. Banks 3.30 3.60 4.10 2.60 1.80
  1.1.3. Revenue to be collected 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  1.1.4. Demand Deposits -0.30 -0.40 -0.30 -0.30 -0.40
  1.1.5. Aviso MF-30 and others 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.30
  1.1.6. Federal Gov.Renegotiation 1.10 1.10 1.10 5.50 9.50
 1.2. External Debt 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.70
Sources: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil .
(1) Excludes subnational public enterprises.
(2) Issued Bonded Debt minus securities in treasury.
Note: "-" means N/A.20
Table 9
State Bonds
 (In million of reais at constant December 1998 Prices)









Alagoas                 -       377.69      440.74      513.32      649.00 21.3%
Bahia       519.38       689.86      805.12      937.02                - 28.0%
Ceará         68.52         91.74      106.91      124.26      157.00 24.8% 21.2% 23.3%
Espírito Santo         86.33       114.38      133.10      154.81                - 25.7%
Goiás       491.97       655.30      764.75      890.17      284.00 28.7% -39.1% -4.6%
Mato Grosso       126.08       168.00      196.37      228.14          6.00 28.8% -82.5% -42.1%
Mato Grosso do Sul       191.85       254.97      296.74      345.27                - 28.5%
Minas Gerais    6,174.95    8,199.64   9,570.87 11,113.86                - 27.9%
Paraíba         38.37         51.23        58.91        69.26        87.00 21.5%
Paraná       275.45       364.59      425.47      49.99      62.00 26.9% 20.8% 24.5%
Pernambuco                 -                 -      620.75      736.51      686.00 5.1%
Piauí                 -                 -               -                -                -
Rio de Janeiro    4,209.82    5,547.45   6,474.77   7,519.58   9,474.00 27.0% 21.0% 24.6%
Rio Grande do Norte                 -                 -                -                -                -
Rio Grande do Sul    4,571.60    6,115.77   7,138.06   8,293.64        32.00 28.4% -93.3% -60.6%
Santa Catarina       579.67       768.49   1,582.96  1,833.30   1,600.00 55.0% 0.5% 30.4%
São Paulo  13,087.16  17,398.92 20,425.79      286.20      283.00 32.2% -88.2% -49.8%
Sergipe       138.41       183.49      213.83      247.50                -
TOTAL  30,559.54  40,981.52 49,255.13 33,787.82 13,879.00 31.1% -46.9% -8.7%
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil and ANDIMA.21
Figure 3
 State Bonds


















































































































































































In order to preserve the stabilization plan, the federal government implemented in November
1995 a comprehensive rescue operation through Vote 162/95 of the National Monetary Council.
It authorized the federal financial institution Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF) to provide
emergency credit lines to the states in exchange for fiscal adjustment programs consistent with
zero operational balances during 1996.  Credit lines were provided for three different purposes:
payment of wage and other outstanding arrears, financing of voluntary retirement programs to be
implemented by the states and refinancing of outstanding AROs.  The states signed agreements
with the federal government with adjustment measures which included reduction of payroll
expenditures to 60 percent of net revenues by 1998, privatization of state assets, improvement
and modernization of tax administration systems, and no contracting of new AROs.
24
The rescue operation did not have the expected results.  The short-run implementation of some
objectives of the programs, such as the  reduction in payroll expenditures to 60 percent of net
revenues, were not realistic.  But the fact that the resources were disbursed up-front, solving the
immediate financial crisis of the states, reduced their incentive to carry on the proposed reforms.
By mid-1996 the underlying fiscal situation of the states remained basically the same.  As arrears
started to be accumulated again, it became clear that the existing fiscal adjustment programs had
to be changed.  It also became evident that the states debts were headed for a new round of
renegotiation.
4.2 The 1997 Debt Bailout
The first explicit signs that a comprehensive debt bailout was forthcoming appeared in late 1995
and early 1996.  The state bank of São Paulo, BANESPA, had been under federal intervention
since December 1994 because of recurrent liquidity problems caused by loans extended to the
state government.  In December 1995, the federal government announced that it was willing to
help the state government to settle its R$ 15 billion debt to BANESPA by issuing R$ 7.5 billion
in federal bonds which would be given to São Paulo to be transferred to the bank.  Those bonds
would carry 30 years maturity and an interest rate of 6 percent, with exchange rate indexation.
The remainder R$ 7.5 billion would come from the sale to the federal government of state’s
assets such as airports and the state railway system.
The rescue operation was submitted to the approval of the Senate’s Economic Affairs Committee
(CAE) and by early April 1996, a group of senators from the North, Northeast and Midwest
regions expressed that they would only approve the federal loan to São Paulo if they could be
assured that their states would have the same treatment.  According to the president of CAE, a
senator from the northern state of Amazonas, the committee had “to take into consideration that
São Paulo would get 30 years to pay its debt with an interest rate of 6 percent, while the other
Brazilian states had to pay interest rates that were at least five times higher than that”.
25
At about the same time, the governors from São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Rio
Grande do Sul, members of the coalition supporting Fernando Henrique Cardoso and leaders of
                                                       
24 The loans carried interest rates equivalent to CEF’s cost of funds rate and maturities up to December 1998.  Except for the credit line for the
voluntary retirement programs, no grace period was granted.  Some R$ 2 billion were disbursed under this program and the majority of the
resources were associated with the credit line provided for the clearance of arrears.
25 Faced with the accusation of purposely trying to hold the approval of the operation in order to put pressure on the federal government, given the
precarious financial situation of BANESPA, the president of CAE replied that the Senate needed “enough time to analyze the situation in depth”.
See “Bancadas ameaçam aprovação do acordo”, O Estado de São Paulo, 04/01/96.23
the largest states of the federation, declared that the time had come for the federal government to
find a “final” solution for their bonded debt problem.  More specifically, the governor of Rio
Grande do Sul announced that he demanded for his state the exact terms of the operation under
negotiation with the state of São Paulo.
In order to cope with the political demands, the president called a meeting with all state
governors in Brasília in late April 96.  At the meeting, he declared for the first time that the
federal government was prepared to address the debt problems of all the states on similar terms.
26
From the beginning, the federal government opposed a general rescue operation and made clear
that the discussions would be conducted on a case-by-case basis with the negotiation of specific
fiscal adjustment programs for each state demanding debt relief.  The negotiations developed for
a few months without any concrete results.  The main impediment in most cases was the states’
resistance to commit to fiscal adjustment programs and to agree with the privatization of their
assets.
After the launching of the Real Plan, the state banks started to have serious financial difficulties
and many of them were put under federal intervention.  Simultaneously to the debt negotiations,
the federal government decided to create the Program to Reduce State Involvement with Banking
Activities (PROES)
27.  Under this program, the federal government provided financing to the
states to clean up their banks and prepare them for privatization, or to transform them in
nonfinancial development agencies.  The financing was restricted to 50 percent of the required
resources.  In the few cases in which the states decided to keep their banks as public financial
institutions, the federal government requested the clean up to be made exclusively with state
funds.
By mid-September 1996, and a few days before the municipal elections, the state of Minas
Gerais reached an agreement in principle with the federal government for a comprehensive
restructuring of its debt.  In the same week, a similar agreement was reached between the state of
Rio Grande do Sul and the federal government.  With these two agreements the federal
government reduced the debt burden of two of the four states with large amounts of bonds and
increased the pressure on the remaining states which at that time were threatening to default on
their debts.
The day after the agreement with Minas Gerais was announced, the leader of PFL
28 in the
Senate, a representative of the northeastern state of Piauí, issued a formal statement requesting
“identical treatment for all states concerning the renegotiation of debts with the federal
government”.  This statement was followed by similar declarations of political leaders of other
northeastern states. The government response was that all the states willing to undertake
adjustment programs, including the privatization of state banks under PROES as it had been the
case of Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, would be eligible in principle for debt
renegotiation. Strengthening the federal government’s bargaining position, the National
Monetary Council authorized in late September 1996 a 90 day rollover of interest payments of
                                                       
26 In Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s words: “I am ready to give you more rope to hang yourselves, because this is what we are talking about”.  See
“Vou lhes dar corda para maior enforcamento”, O Estado de São Paulo, 04/24/96.
27 Medida Provisória 1514 of August 7, 1996.
28 One of the three major parties in the coalition supporting Fernando Henrique Cardoso.24
loans with federal financial institutions for the states engaged in debt and fiscal adjustment
negotiations with the federal government.
Senators from Maranhão and Paraíba, two other northeastern states complained that the federal
approach for debt relief represented a “unfair treatment to poor states”.  A major complaint was
that a renegotiation emphasizing state bonds, such as the one that was under way, would benefit
the four richest states (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul) which
were responsible for about 90 percent of the stock of state bonds (Table 9).
On October 1996, the governors of 19 states met in São Paulo and announced that they were
abandoning the negotiations with the Ministry of Finance’s team and would discuss their debt
problems directly with the Senate.  The states asked for a renegotiation of the 1993 bailout which
established 20 years maturities for the restructured debt.  They wanted to extend it to 30 years, in
line with the maturities negotiated with Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul.  Finally, they
demanded a reduction of the ceiling for debt service expressed in Senate Resolution 11.
The presence of São Paulo in this group conferred more credibility to the states’ threat, since the
state was the largest bond debtor and was governed by one of the main leaders of Fernando
Henrique Cardoso’s party (PSDB).  The major obstacle for the renegotiation with São Paulo was
BANESPA.  While the federal government only accepted to assume the debts of the state with
the bank if it were liquidated or federalized for privatization latter on, the state governor insisted
in keeping it as a state bank.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso declared that he was not going to give up to pressures and that the
previous debt renegotiations would not be reopened.  He insisted that states wanting to
renegotiate their debts should be willing to implement the fiscal adjustment programs negotiated
directly with the Ministry of Finance’s team.
Finally, in mid-November 1996 the governor of São Paulo announced that he was giving up
BANESPA.  An agreement in principle was concluded with the federal government for the
renegotiation of the state debts.  With the agreement, and the transfer of the state debts with the
bank to the federal government, the main obstacle for the privatization of BANESPA
disappeared, since 51 percent of the bank’s shares were transferred to the federal government.
The agreement with São Paulo was followed by similar agreements with smaller states.
The outcome of the prolonged political negotiations between federal and states’ governments
was Law 9496, of September 11 1997, which established a standard framework for the debt
restructuring contracts.  Those contracts, to be signed between the federal government and each
state government, involved the replacement of securitized debts and state debts to banks with
debt to the federal treasury.
29  The restructured debt was divided into two portions.  The first one
was the so called “conta-gráfica”, which in most cases was equivalent to 20 percent of the
refinanced debt and had to be amortized before December 1998 with the proceedings of the
privatization of state assets.  Those assets had to be identified in advance in the contracts to be
submitted to the approval of the state assemblies.  The remaining 80 percent of the debt has
                                                       
29 Also in September 1997 the federal government received Senate’s authorization to issue R$103 billion in federal bonds to finance the
restructuring of state debts and to finance the restructuring of the state banking system through PROES.25
maturities of up to 30 years and an annual interest rate of 6 percent, plus monetary correction.  A
cap of 13 to 15 percent of net revenues was established for the annual debt-service ratio and all
debt service exceeding this cap is automatically capitalized under the contracts.  As a guarantee
to the federal government for the  service of the restructured debt, the state governments pledged
their ICMS and FPE revenues.
Since the 6 percent real interest rate is substantially lower than the real interest rates at which the
federal government will likely finance its debt during the contract period, the contracts involve a
subsidy on the restructured debt.
30  They also included an up-front debt forgiveness referring to
the securitized debt.  It resulted from the difference between the overnight rate and the 6 percent
real interest rate applied to the stock of restructured debt during the period going from the cut-off
date to the actual signing of the contracts.
In exchange for the restructuring of the debt, the states made commitments to undertake
adjustment programs designed to reduce the debt to net revenue ratio to less than 100 percent
within a specified period, which ranged from 6 to 19 years, depending on the state.  Those
programs involved specific targets for primary balances, payroll and investment expenditures,
and for the privatization of states assets.  Deviations from the agreed targets are punishable under
the contracts with an increase of 4 percentage points in the debt service caps and the utilization
of market interest rates in place of the 6 percent real interest rate.
31
With the approval of the constitutional amendment authorizing the reelection for president and
governors in early 1997, the federal government tried to accelerate the completion of the
contracts so that they could be ready well ahead of the 1998 elections.  However, many state
governors postponed the completion of formal contracts, in an attempt to extract even more
favorable terms from the federal government.  The first contract containing both fiscal
adjustment and debt restructuring agreements was signed by São Paulo only in December 1997.
The last contract was signed in June 1998.
In the end, some R$ 87 billion were restructured under Law 9496 
32.  As Table 10 shows, the
majority of the states restructured their debts with 30 year maturities and 6 percent real interest
rates.  In some cases, such as Minas Gerais, Pará and Rio de Janeiro, the real interest rate
increased to 7.5 percent because the states were not able to finance the 20 percent of the
restructured debt with resources from the privatization of state assets.  In some other cases, such
as Ceará, Piauí and Rio Grande do Norte,  the states voluntarily opted for shorter maturities.  The
majority of the restructured debt refers to the states of the Southeast region, which were the
states with larger amounts of bonds.  Contrary to the 1989 and 1993 bailouts, when it represented
a significant proportion of the total amount restructured, the Northeast region received only 2.7
percent of the total bailout.
                                                       
30 See Bevilaqua, Carneiro, Garcia and Werneck (1998) for an estimate of this subsidy.
31 As of December 1999 the government has not yet released any information on states’ compliance with the targets of the adjustment programs.
Some preliminary evidence released in the press, however, indicates that the targets have been largely missed.
32 In current reais.  This amount does not include the resources used to reform the state banks through the PROES.26
Table 10.a
The  1997 Debt Bailout - Amount Renegotiated *
 States    Values In Percent
 of 1997
State GDP
 In Per Capita
Terms
(1997 Population)
 Share in Total
Amount
Renegotiated
 Acre       - -     -    -
 Alagoas       - -     -    -
 Amapá       - -     -    -
 Amazonas        120.18   1.17%       49.56    0.1%
 Bahia        962.43   2.77%        73.93    1.1%
 Ceará        114.81   0.84%        16.69    0.1%
 Distrito Federal        - -     -    -
 Espírito Santo        433.10   3.28%     150.60    0.5%
 Goiás     1,350.39   7.57%     303.67    1.5%
 Maranhão        244.55   2.89%       45.50    0.3%
 Mato Grosso        812.85   9.65%     331.34    0.9%
 Mato Grosso do Sul         910.42   9.78%      460.71    1.0%
 Minas Gerais   11,941.06 15.95%     707.96 13.4%
 Pará        276.55   1.56%       48.61    0.3%
 Paraíba        268.31   4.43%       78.78    0.3%
 Paraná        523.83   1.19%       59.27    0.6%
 Pernambuco        164.11   0.92%        21.61    0.2%
 Piauí        250.90   6.23%        89.83    0.3%
 Rio de Janeiro     8,559.33   9.81%      632.73    9.6%
 Rio Grande do Norte          57.36   0.73%       21.55    0.1%
 Rio Grande do Sul     9,524.70 17.77%     973.16 10.7%
 Rondônia        148.36   2.48%      102.91    0.2%
 Roraima            7.30   0.63%       25.68    0.0%
 Santa Catarina     1,564.02   6.54%    314.24    1.8%
 São Paulo  50,730.40 18.75%  1,461.67 56.8%
 Sergipe      389.64   6.22%     234.78    0.4%
 Tocantins    - -    -    -
 TOTAL 89,354.60 11.65%     558.08 100.0%
 Memorandum items:
 Mid-West Region   3,073.65   5.49%     287.81    3.4%
 North Region      552.39   1.38%       47.22    0.6%
 Northeast Region   2,452.11   2.36%       53.13    2.7%
 South Region 11,612.55   9.56%     492.01 13.0%
 Southeast Region 71,663.90 16.07%  1,054.23 80.2%
 Sources: Ministry of Finance (Home-Page) and O Estado de São Paulo.
  Note: Bailout Amounts inflated by IGP-DI (month of contract); while GDP inflated by IGP-DI year average.
* Renegotiated Amounts in Constant December 1998 Prices.27
Table 10.b
The  1997 Debt Bailout - Amount Forgiven *
 States Values In Percent
of 1997
State GDP
 In Per Capita
Terms
(1997 Population)
 Share in Total
Amount
Forgiven
 Acre      - -      -   -
 Alagoas      - -      -   -
 Amapá      - -      -   -
 Amazonas      - -      -   -
 Bahia       52.99 0.15%      4.07     0.7%
 Ceará      11.24 0.08%      1.63     0.1%
 Distrito Federal       - -      -   -
 Espírito Santo      42.90 0.33%     14.92     0.5%
 Goiás     178.63 1.00%     40.17     2.3%
 Maranhão        7.82 0.09%       1.45     0.1%
 Mato Grosso      25.97 0.31%      10.59     0.3%
 Mato Grosso do Sul      98.25 1.06%      49.72     1.2%
 Minas Gerais 1,658.24 2.21%      98.31   20.9%
 Pará      13.43 0.08%       2.36     0.2%
 Paraíba      22.22 0.37%       6.53     0.3%
 Paraná     58.04 0.13%      6.57     0.7%
 Pernambuco       6.09 0.03%      0.80     0.1%
 Piauí    10.14 0.25%      3.63     0.1%
 Rio de Janeiro      - -    -  -
 Rio Grande do Norte         0.79 0.01%      0.30    0.0%
 Rio Grande do Sul  1,658.23 3.09%  169.43   20.9%
 Rondônia        3.30 0.06%      2.29    0.0%
 Roraima        0.65 0.06%      2.29    0.0%
 Santa Catarina    162.84 0.68%    32.72    2.1%
 São Paulo 3,829.42 1.41% 110.34  48.4%
 Sergipe    75.24 1.20%  45.34   1.0%
 Tocantins     - - -  -
 TOTAL 7,916.43 1.03% 49.44 100.0%
 Memorandum items:
 Mid-West Region     302.84 0.54% 28.36    3.8%
 North Region       17.39 0.04%   1.49   0.2%
 Northeast Region     186.53 0.18%   4.04   2.4%
 South Region 1,879.11 1.55% 79.62 23.7%
 Southeast Region 5,530.56 1.24% 81.36 69.9%
 Sources: Ministry of Finance (Home-Page) and O Estado de São Paulo.
  Note: Bailout Amounts inflated by IGP-DI (month of contract); while GDP inflated by IGP-DI year average.
* Forgiven Amounts in Constant December 1998 Prices.28
Table 10.c
The  1997 Debt Bailout - Amount Refinanced *
 States Values In Percent
of 1997
State GDP
 In Per Capita
Terms
(1997 Population)
 Share in Total
Amount
Refinanced
 Acre        -     -     - -
 Alagoas        -     -     - -
 Amapá        -     -     - -
 Amazonas       120.18       1.17%       49.56   0.1%
 Bahia      909.44       2.62%       69.86   1.1%
 Ceará      103.57      0.76%       15.06   0.1%
 Distrito Federal      -     -     - -
 Espírito Santo       390.21       2.96%       135.69    0.5%
 Goiás   1,171.76       6.57%      263.50   1.5%
 Maranhão      236.74       2.79%        44.05   0.3%
 Mato Grosso       786.88       9.34%      320.75   1.0%
 Mato Grosso do Sul      812.18       8.73%       410.99   1.0%
 Minas Gerais 10,282.82     13.73%      609.64 12.8%
 Pará       263.11      1.48%        46.25   0.3%
 Paraíba       246.08       4.06%        72.25   0.3%
 Paraná      465.80       1.06%        52.71   0.6%
 Pernambuco       158.02       0.88%       20.80   0.2%
 Piauí      240.76      5.98%       86.20   0.3%
 Rio de Janeiro   7,703.40      8.83%      569.46   9.6%
 Rio Grande do Norte        56.56      0.72%       21.25   0.1%
 Rio Grande do Sul   7,866.47    14.67%    803.74   9.8%
 Rondônia       145.06       2.43%     100.62    0.2%
 Roraima          6.65      0.57%      23.39    0.0%
 Santa Catarina   1,401.17      5.86%    281.52    1.7%
 São Paulo 46,900.97   17.33% 1,351.33  58.2%
 Sergipe    314.40      5.02%   189.44    0.4%
 Tocantins  - - - -
 TOTAL 80,582.24 10.50%  503.29 100.0%
 Memorandum items:
 Mid-West Region    2,770.81    4.95%  259.45    3.4%
 North Region      535.00    1.34%    45.74   0.7%
 Northeast Region    2,265.58    2.18%    49.09   2.8%
 South Region    9,733.44    8.01%  412.40 12.1%
 Southeast Region 65,277.40 14.64%  960.28 81.0%
  Sources: Ministry of Finance (Home-Page) and O Estado de São Paulo.
  Note: Bailout Amounts inflated by IGP-DI (month of contract); while GDP inflated by IGP-DI year average.
* Refinanced Amounts in Constant December 1998 Prices.29
Table 10.d




 Acre - - -
 Alagoas - - -
 Amapá - - -
 Amazonas 20% 30  6.0
 Bahia 20% 30  6.0
 Ceará 20% 15  6.0
 Distrito Federal - - -
 Espírito Santo   7% 30  6.0
 Goiás 20% 30  6.0
 Maranhão 20% 30  6.0
 Mato Grosso 20% 30  6.0
 Mato Grosso do Sul 10% 30  6.0
 Minas Gerais 10% 30  7.5
 Pará 10% 30  7.5
 Paraíba 5% 30  6.0
 Paraná 20% 30  6.0
 Pernambuco 20% 30  6.0
 Piauí 20% 15  6.0
 Rio de Janeiro 11% 30  7.5
 Rio Grande do Norte 20% 15  6.0
 Rio Grande do Sul 15% 30  6.0
 Rondônia 20% 30  6.0
 Roraima 20% 30  6.0
 Santa Catarina 19% 30  6.0
 São Paulo 13% 30  6.0
 Sergipe 13% 30  6.0
 Tocantins - - -
WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
13% 29.9  6.3
 Sources: Ministry of Finance (Home-Page) and O Estado de São Paulo.30
5. An Assessment of the Bailout Problem in Brazilian States
Having the preceding chapters as background, this chapters assesses the state debt bailout
problem in Brazil.  It starts with an analysis of the determinants of state debt bailouts and
concludes with an evaluation of the empirical relationship between bailouts and fiscal discipline
in the Brazilian states.
5.1 The determinants of state debt bailouts
This section discusses the determinants of state debt bailouts in Brazil along the lines of a
conceptual framework which recognizes that the essence of the bailout question is the issue of
moral hazard.
33  A distinct characteristic of the state debt bailout problem is the fact that under
some specific conditions, even if the federal government knows that the states precarious
financial situation can be attributed to their own reckless behavior, it may choose to bail them
out.  A bailout may be extended because the federal government cares about the welfare of
states’ citizens,  because there are political benefits associated with the decision of rescuing the
states, or because of the scope for negative externalities on the rest of the country in the absence
of a bailout.  In what follows, the relevant factors for explaining state debt bailouts in Brazil
according to this framework are grouped into ex-post, ex-ante and reputational determinants of
bailouts.
5.1.1 Ex-post determinants
Ex-post factors can provide a central contribution for the understanding of the state debt bailout
problem in Brazil.  Brazilian states have a high degree of political autonomy but do not have a
corresponding degree of fiscal autonomy.  As shown in the Appendix
34, federal transfers
comprise  a significant part of the revenues at the disposal of the majority of Brazilian states.  In
addition,  the assignment of tax bases to different government levels is regulated by the
constitution and states cannot create new taxes at their discretion.  Their main source of state’s
tax revenue, the general value-added tax on goods and services (ICMS), is administered by the
Committee of the Secretaries of Finance of the States (CONFAZ), chaired by the Deputy
Finance Minister.  Though states have some limited ability to modify tax rates, changes in tax
rates or on the tax base must be submitted by individual states for the approval of the Committee.
Brazilian states, therefore, have little flexibility regarding their revenues, making it harder for the
federal government to ask them to bear the cost of adjustment in the event of a debt crisis.
Expenditure rigidities also constrain the states’ ability to react to a fiscal crisis.  State payroll
expenditures reached an average of about 70 percent of their net revenues during 1995/1997.
35
Under the 1988 Constitution, redundant public employees at all three levels of government
cannot be fired.  Their salaries cannot be reduced in nominal terms and they have the right to
retire after 35 years in service with a benefit corresponding to their last salary in office.  In
addition, they are entitled to increases in their retirement benefits whenever the government
grants salary increases to active personnel.
                                                       
33 See Inter-American Development Bank (1998).
34 See Table A8.
35 See Table 7 in Section 4.1.31
A second ex-post determinant which is highly relevant for the correct understanding of the state
debt bailout problem in Brazil is the scope for negative externalities associated with the decision
of not extending a bailout.  As the discussion in previous chapters indicated, Brazilian states
relied on their own banks as a major source of finance for an extended period of time.  With the
stabilization of the economy after mid-1994, the financial sector went through a period of
substantial restructuring because of the effects of lower inflation on the balance-sheets of the
banking system.
36  The effects were particularly intense in the case of state owned banks which
have traditionally been much less efficient than their private counterparts.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the 1997 bailout owns a lot to the precarious financial situation of
BANESPA, the state bank of São Paulo and one of the largest commercial banks in Brazil, in the
wake of the stabilization.  BANESPA was put under federal intervention in December 1994,
because of serious liquidity problems raised by bad loans extended to the state government
during many years.  In order to be able to help the state of São Paulo settle its debts to
BANESPA, preventing a major financial crisis which could have had a serious impact on the
financial system at a critical junction, the federal government was forced into a broad process of
debt renegotiation with the remaining Brazilian states.  As illustrated by the previous discussion
of the developments that ended in the 1997 bailout, political representatives from other states
grasped the importance of what was at stake in the case of BANESPA, and quickly used it to
leverage their own financial demands.
37
Finally, a third ex-post factor helping to understand the bailout problem in Brazil refers to the
political benefits for the federal government associated with the decision of extending a bailout
to the states.  The 1997 bailout was negotiated in two stages.  In both stages, the political
attention was concentrated on major events.  The first stage corresponded to the negotiation of
the agreements in principle with the states and coincided with the 1996 municipal elections, and
with the discussion in Congress of the constitutional amendment authorizing a second term in
office for the president, state governors and city mayors.  The second stage corresponded to the
negotiation of the final contracts with the states.  It occurred in parallel with the launching of
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s and many state governors’ campaigns for a second term
in office.  Therefore, the political benefits associated with extending a bailout to the states were
considerably high.
In addition, the political cost for the federal government of not extending a bailout to the states
was high because one of the fundamental reasons for the 1995-1996 fiscal crisis in the states,
which ended up motivating the 1997 bailout, can be traced to the federal government actions. As
a result of the monetary policy adopted in the period after the launching of the Real Plan, real
interest rates were consistently over 30 percent a year during 1995.  Given that most states’ debts
were contracted at variable real interest rates, and that the capitalization of scheduled interest
payments was a standard practice, the increase in real interest rates put state debts into an
explosive path.
38
                                                       
36 See Bevilaqua and Loyo (1998) for an analysis of recent developments in the Brazilian banking system.
37 As put by Wildasin (1997), BANESPA was “too big to fail”.
38 See the discussion on the role of the interest rate in the 1995-96 fiscal crisis in the states in Section 4.1.  Though high real interest rates made
debt service unbearable, the evolution of states debt was probably not sustainable otherwise.32
As mentioned above, the comprehensive 1997 bailout took place immediately before an election
year, increasing the political benefits for the federal government associated with extending a
bailout to the states.  Two hypothesis on factors affecting the political benefits for the federal
government from extending a bailout are now tested with data for the 1997 bailout
39:
i)  states with larger populations, which can affect the electoral results at the federal level, will
have larger bailouts;
 
ii)  states in which the government belongs to the coalition supporting the federal government
will have larger bailouts;
The analysis is based on a reduced form model and is implemented with cross-section data for
the Brazilian states.  Out of the potential 27 observations, a total of 5 observations were excluded
of the estimations because the states did not get a bailout in 1997.
40  The dependent variable is
the 1997 per capita amount of debt renegotiated, expressed in constant prices of December 1998.
The basic model includes the following control variables: states 1997 per capita GDP and the
lagged per capita bailout, which corresponds to the amount of the 1993 renegotiation.  Both
variables are also expressed in constant December 1998 prices.  The variables of interest for the
two hypothesis are the 1997 states population, expressed in thousands of people, and a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 whenever the state government belongs to the national coalition
supporting Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
Table 11 presents the results of the empirical analysis of the determinants of the 1997 bailout.
The first column shows the results for the basic model, which includes only the control variables.
The coefficient on the per capita GDP variable is positive, indicating that richer states got larger
per capita bailouts.  The coefficient on the lagged bailout variable is also positive, but is not
significantly different from zero at standard confidence levels.  The second and third columns in
Table 11 test the two hypothesis on factors affecting the political benefits for the federal
government from extending a bailout.  Equation 2 adds the 1997 population to the basic model.
Its estimated coefficient has the expected positive sign and is significantly different from zero at
very high confidence levels.  The result provides support for the hypothesis that more populous
states, which can potentially affect the electoral results, got larger per capita bailouts in 1997.  In
addition, when the population is included in Equation 2, the coefficient on the lagged bailout
variable increases and becomes significant at the 90 percent confidence level.  The model
explains 77 percent of the cross-section variation in the 1997 per capita bailout values.
Equation 3 adds the president’s coalition dummy to the basic model to test the second hypothesis
on factors affecting the political benefit for the federal government from extending a bailout.  Its
coefficient has the hypothesized positive sign, indicating that states where the governor is a
member of the national coalition supporting Fernando Henrique Cardoso got larger per capita
bailouts, but is not estimated with precision.  Finally, the last column of Table 11 (Equation 4)
incorporates the two explanatory variables of interest to the basic model. When the four
variables are included in the model at the same time, only two of them, states per capita GDP and
population, have statistical significance.
                                                       
39 The extension of the statistical analysis to the 1989 and 1993 bailouts did not produce meaningful results.
40 One of this states, Alagoas, was under federal intervention for some time.  The other four states, Acre, Amapá, Distrito Federal and Tocantins,
were created recently and did not have significant amounts of debt at the time of  the 1997 bailout.33
Table 11
Determinants of the 1997 Bailout
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
Constant  -422.77  -418.91    -577.72    535.35
    (-2.68)    (-5.14)      (-2.72)      (0.26)
Per capita GDP       0.19     0.12      0.19      0.12
      (3.75)     (3.45)      (4.03)      (3.82)
Lagged per capita bailout        0.02     0.31      0.03      0.30
      (0.10)     (1.78)     (0.11)      (1.40)
Population    -    27.20    -    26.11
     (5.87)      (5.89)
President’s coalition dummy    -    -    184.60    138.53
     (1.26)      (1.26)
Adjusted R
2     0.58    0.77    0.60     0.79
Number of Observations       22      22      22       22
Standard Error 240.9 176.45 234.69 171.25
Note: t-statistics in parentheses, White-type standard errors.
 5.1.2 Ex-ante determinants
The most important ex-ante determinant of bailouts in the Brazilian case refers to an institutional
factor affecting the ability of state governments to misbehave: their high degree of borrowing
autonomy.  Brazilian states have always had a high degree of borrowing autonomy.  Over the
period studied in this paper, the states went from borrowing from external sources to borrowing
from the domestic banking sector at market interest rates using federal transfers as guarantee.  In
the process, they also borrowed extensively from their own banks and from domestic capital
markets through the issue of bonds.  State borrowing has always been subject to Senate’s
approval, which is based on central banks’ creditworthiness evaluations.  However, despite the
fact that the central bank repeatedly produced negative creditworthiness reports, the Senate
always authorized state’s credit operations claiming the “exceptional nature” of particular
requests.  In addition, in many occasions the Senate authorized the rollover of principal and
interest payments, leaving the states subject to a very soft budget constraint.34
Over the years, the effects of the lack of control on the part of the Senate were intensified by
reputational effects.  The anticipation of bailouts on the part of the federal government helped
states to have access to private credit and removed market discipline on their budgets.  From the
point of view of private creditors, lending to the states was a very profitable activity.  Because of
the perception of increased risk, the states used to pay interest rates higher than the rates paid by
federal government.  Given the bailouts, however, those higher interest rates ended up reflecting
higher returns in the context of a low risk investment.
41  A clear example of this situation was the
1994 bond exchange, described in Chapter 3, which eliminated the fiscal discipline that financial
markets were trying to impose on the states through their refusal to hold their bonds.
5.1.3 Reputational determinants
Given that three comprehensive state debt bailouts were extended during a period of only eight
years, reputational factors ought to be very important determinants of bailouts in the Brazilian
case. The 1989, 1993 and 1997 bailouts took place immediately before election years, reducing
the gains for the federal government from establishing a reputation for denying bailouts.  The
1997 bailout, however, was extended in a period of consolidation of the stabilization plan in the
country.  This has increased the gains from establishing a reputation for imposing harder budget
constraints on state governments and the federal government conditioned the restructuring of the
debt on the implementation of fiscal adjustment programs in the states.
5.2 Bailouts and fiscal discipline
Debt bailouts are a mechanism for states to transfer their fiscal deficits to the federal
government.  If they know that the federal government will recurrently bail them out, state
governments will consistently overspend.  Counting only major bailout operations, Brazilian
states were rescued three times by the federal government in the last decade.  During the same
period, their fiscal performance worsened considerably and they became a major factor in the
observed deterioration in the consolidated public sector fiscal stance after the Real Plan.
This section conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between debt bailouts and fiscal
discipline in the Brazilian states during 1991-1997.  The main hypothesis to be tested is whether
states that get larger bailouts tend to have higher spending.  The analysis is based on a standard
reduced-form model of the determinants of per capita state spending 
42 and is conducted with the
use of pooled cross-section data for the 27 Brazilian states.
43  Annual averages are used for the
1991-1994 and 1995-1998 governmental terms.
44  Out of the potential 54 observations, a total of
7 observations were excluded of the data because the corresponding states were not bailed out,
leaving a final population of 47 state-legislature observations.  The dependent variable in the
analysis is average per capita spending in the states (excluding interest payments).  The values
are expressed in constant prices of December 1998.  The basic model includes the following
control variables, also expressed in constant values of December 1998: states per capita GDP,
per capita federal constitutional transfers from the federal government and per capita voluntary
                                                       
41 The largest Brazilian banks used to be the main holders of the states’ debt.
42 See Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (1999).
43 The main source of the raw data is above-the-line fiscal information consolidated by Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional.
44 Actually, due to data limitations the averages for the second governmental term were calculated only with value for 1995-1997.35
transfers from the federal government.  An initial specification was employed in which
constitutional and voluntary transfers were aggregated in one single variable.  However, this
specification was always outperformed by the specification with separated transfers.  That could
possibly be explained by the fact that during 1991-1997 the composition of the total transfers
from the federal government changed because of the introduction of the Fiscal Stabilization Fund
(FEF) in 1993.  The FEF is an emergency mechanism introduced in the preparation of the Real
Plan to reduce the earmarking of federal funds.
45
To test the hypothesis of main interest, lagged bailout values are included as additional
explanatory variables in the basic reduced form equation.  Average per capita spending in one
governmental term is a function of per capita state GDP and per capita transfers during the same
governmental term and per capita bailout in the previous term.
46 As with the other variables, per
capita bailout values are expressed in constant prices of December 1998.  Table 12 presents the
results of the empirical analysis of the determinants of per capita spending in Brazilian states
during 1991-1997.  The first two columns of the table present the results for the pooled cross-
section data estimation.  Equation 1 includes only the three control variables. All estimated
coefficients in Equation 1 have their expected signs and are significantly different from zero at
very high confidence levels.  The coefficient on the voluntary transfers is larger than the
coefficient on the constitutional transfers, indicating a higher states’ propensity to spend out of
exceptional funds.  The second equation retains the control variables of the first equation and
adds the lagged per capita bailout variable. The estimated coefficient on the bailout variable has
the expected sign and is significantly different from zero at the 89 percent confidence level.  The
result provides support for the hypothesis of interest in this section: all else being equal, states
that get larger bailouts tend to spend more.  The presence of the lagged bailout variable does not
significantly affect the coefficients of the other explanatory variables in Equation 2, and the
overall explanatory power of the model increases marginally when the variable is included.
Equations 1 and 2 constrain the value of the coefficients to be the same during the entire 1991-
1997 period.  The response of spending to the control variables, however, might have changed
during the period because of the effects of the introduction of the Fiscal Stabilization Fund
(FEF).  Also, since the 1989 and 1993 bailouts referred to different types of debt, the response of
spending to bailouts might be different in the two sub-periods.  The empirical model, therefore,
might have a better explanatory power if it estimated separately for the two sub-periods.  In order
to assess this possibility, the last four columns of Table 12 split the 1991-1997 period into the
two relevant sub-periods.  The results indicate that the coefficient on voluntary transfers is larger
in the more recent period, while the coefficient on constitutional transfers is larger in the first
period.  Both results are consistent with the notion that the introduction of the FEF changed the
composition of federal transfers to the states, having an effect on their impact on states’
spending.  The coefficient on the lagged bailout variable in the period 1991-1994 (Equation 4) is
larger and is estimated with more precision than the coefficient on the same variable in the more
recent period (Equation 6).
                                                       
45 Initially, the FEF’s denomination was “Fundo Social de Emergência (FSE)”.  See Afonso and Carvalho (1996) for a description of the FSE.
46 Therefore, the 1989 debt bailout is used to explain spending during 1991-1994, and the 1993 debt bailout is used to explain spending during
1995-1997.36
Table 12
Determinants of State Per Capita Noninterest Spending
Variable 1991-1997 1991-1994 1995-1997
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6
Constant    -9.77   -11.55  -60.22  -79.10     37.65    17.45
   (-0.58)     (-0.66)    (-2.07)    (-2.90)      (1.46)     (0.66)
Per capita GDP      0.06      0.06      0.08      0.07      0.05      0.05
     (7.97)      (7.01)      (7.53)      (7.29)      (1.59)      (3.66)
Per capita constitutional      0.74      0.70      1.01      1.05     0.65      0.61
     (9.66)      (7.16)      (5.61)      (7.36)   (13.78)    (19.05)
Per capita voluntary transfers     2.83      2.98      1.33      1.77     3.12     3.50
    (2.93)      (3.10)     (1.45)     (1.88)     (2.08)     (2.34)
Lagged per capita bailout       -     0.09       -      0.37       -     0.10
   (1.62)     (2.51)     (1.85)
Adjusted R
2      0.88     0.89      0.92      0.94      0.86      0.87
Number of Observations        47       47        23        23        24        24
Standard Error   57.40  54.97   39.17    34.48   62.67    60.05
Note: t-statistics in parentheses, White-type standard errors.37
6. Policy Conclusions
The lack of effective control on borrowing, coupled with reputational effects originating from the
repeated bailout operations, reduced fiscal discipline and created an explosive accumulation of
debts in Brazilian states during the last decade.  Under the Brazilian Constitution, the control of
public sector borrowing is attributed to the Senate, which has always shown a remarkable degree
of tolerance with regard to increases in state indebtedness.  The states have also been submitted
to very little market discipline on their borrowing operations.  In fact, the prospects of federal
government bailouts have induced private institutions to overextend credit to state governments
in anticipation of higher returns.
Given the accumulated debts, state bailouts by the federal government can be readily rationalized
in the Brazilian case by a series of ex-post factors.  The limited degree of fiscal autonomy of
Brazilian states imply that their citizens would be submitted to intense hardships if the states had
to bear the cost of adjustment themselves in the event of a debt crisis.  In addition,
comprehensive debt bailouts have normally occurred before election years, when the political
benefits for the federal government of granting a bailout are normally higher.  Finally, a major
motivation for the 1997 debt bailout was the presence of important negative externalities on the
Brazilian financial system associated with an eventual decision of not extending a bailout.
As the successive bailouts were extended without being followed by institutional changes that
reduced the states’ incentives to misbehave, a perverse fiscal regime was introduced.  Brazilian
states could consistently overspend, knowing that their deficits would be latter on transferred to
the federal government through a bailout operation.  In fact, state government bailouts in Brazil
provide a clear example of how the bailout problem could be thought of as a repeated game.
Counting only the most significant bailout operations, Brazilian states were rescued three times
by the federal government in the last decade.  During the same period, the states’ fiscal
performance worsened considerably.  The study presented empirical evidence that the occurrence
of bailouts is associated with lower fiscal discipline in Brazilian states during the 1990s.
The fiscal regime associated with the recurrent bailouts was sustainable only in an environment
in which the federal government was able to relax its own budget constraint through the inflation
rate.  The stabilization of the economy after 1994 and the need to implement a fiscal regime
consistent with price stability, has led to a change in the federal government’s approach
regarding state debt bailouts.  Unlike previous episodes, the 1997 debt bailout was conditioned
on the adoption of fiscal adjustment programs and states pledges of own and shared revenues as
guarantees to the federal government for the service of the restructured debts.  As the discussion
in previous chapters indicated, states resisted to commit to those programs, but in the end the
federal  government’s approach was adopted.
The recent debt restructuring agreements, therefore, represent an important step in the right
direction in addressing the problem of fiscal discipline in Brazilian states.  Through the
agreements, state banks and state enterprises have been privatized, suppressing two of the most
important sources of finance for the Brazilian states in the recent past.  The impact of the
agreements on states’ fiscal behavior will depend, of course, on the federal governments
resolution to enforce the terms of the contracts.  States can only issue new debt after their debt to38
revenue ratio drops below 100 percent.  Therefore, if the amount of debt service established in
the contracts is assured, the states will be in fact generating primary surpluses on the same
values.  This will represent a significant departure with respect to states fiscal behavior in recent
years.
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The use of state revenues to guarantee the service of the restructured debts has been put to an
important test in the recent episode in which the governor of Minas Gerais announced a 90 days
moratorium on the states’ debts and precipitated the external crisis that led to the devaluation of
the Real in the second week of January 1999.  The government response was to hold state
revenues in the same amount of the scheduled debt service.  In addition, the government declined
to give a federal guarantee to loans to the state and formally announced to international
organizations that Minas Gerais had defaulted on its debts to the federal government.  The
firmness of the federal government’s reaction, which was the only available option to restore its
credibility in the middle of a severe external crisis, helped to discourage a similar behavior on
the part of the remaining states.
A more permanent solution to the states debt problem will require, however, that political will is
complemented in the short run with measures to control states’ borrowing in an environment in
which the conditions for the effective introduction of market discipline are not yet present.
Before markets could impose discipline on Brazilian states by refusing to hold their debts, it is
necessary that the federal government establishes a credible reputation of not extending bailouts,
a task which could take many years to be accomplished.  In the meantime, given the ex-post
reasons for extending a bailout once a significant amount of debt is accumulated and a debt crisis
takes place,  states’ borrowing has to be kept under control.
In this respect, the study offers an important contribution to the current policy debate in the
country.  A Fiscal Responsibility Law is currently under discussion in the congress.   It defines
principles, norms and rules to be observed by the three government branches and will regulate
Article 163 of the Brazilian Constitution which deals with public finance, public debt and the
granting of public guarantees. The Fiscal Responsibility Law introduces restrictions on public
indebtedness by placing limits on debt stocks and credit operations.  It also prohibits the
refinancing of state and municipalities debts by the federal government and prohibits their credit
operations in cases in which they are not complying with scheduled debt service payments.  In
order to assure compliance with the law, institutional penalties attribute personal responsibility to
public administrators.
Until such legislation is approved, the federal government will have to reduce the states’
incentives for fiscal misbehavior by restricting their access to financing sources and by enforcing
debt service under the existing agreements.  Therefore, despite the generous conditions with
which the state debts have been restructured, entailing large subsidies from the federal
government, state governments are likely to continue to be a weak link in the fiscal adjustment
effort in Brazil.
                                                       
47 Preliminary data for 1999 in fact indicate that the Brazilian states will have a consolidated primary surplus for the first time since 1994.39
APPENDIX
STATES REVENUES, 1985-199740
1. Distribution of revenues across government levels
As Table A1 indicates, total tax revenues increased from an average of  24 percent of GDP
during 1985-1990 to an average of more than 27 percent of GDP during the 1990s.  This was a
result of increased own revenue-raising powers of the three levels of government.  After
declining during the second half of the 1980s 
48, federal tax revenues increased during the 1990s
to an average of about 19 percent of GDP.  As a share of total tax revenues, federal revenues
declined from an average of 72 percent before the 1988 Reform to 68 percent during the period
of higher decentralization, increasing again to about 69 percent during 1992-1997 (Table A2).
For the states, the expansion in the ICMS base made it possible to increase own revenues from
an average of 5.8 percent of GDP before the 1988 Reform to more than 7.2 percent of GDP after
1989.  As a share of total revenues for the three levels of government, states own revenues
increased from an average of 25 percent in 1985-1988 to 29 percent in the two years immediately
after the Reform, declining slightly to more than 26 percent during 1993-1997.  Finally, in the
case of the municipalities the major effect of the 1988 Reform was an increase in own revenues
from 0.6 percent of GDP during the second half of the 1980s to more than 1 percent of GDP
during the 1990s.  In relative terms, municipalities own revenues increased from 2.4 percent to 4
percent of total revenues between 1985 and 1990.
The numbers on Table A2 also show that the decentralization of revenues was more intense
during 1989-1991.  After that, the decentralization process lost some of its impulse and federal
revenues increased again as a share of total revenues.  However, this increase was not a
deliberate result of the 1988 Reform.  Rather, it was the response of the federal government to
the loss of revenue, by relying increasingly on sources of revenue that are not subject to sharing
with subnational governments.  The so called social contributions increased from 7 percent of
GDP in 1985 to an average of 12 percent of GDP between 1994 and 1997.  Alternatively, federal
revenues subject to sharing with subnational governments declined from an average of 9 percent
of GDP during the late 1980s to an average of 7.7 percent of GDP during the 1990s.
Turning to revenues at the disposal of each level of government, the increase in social
contributions more than compensated the effects of the 1988 Reform on the federal government.
Revenues at the disposal of the federal government increased from an average of about 14
percent of GDP during the second half of the 1980s to an average of more than 15 percent of
GDP during the 1990s (Table A3).  During the same period, revenues at the disposal of state and
municipal governments increased, respectively, from 5.6 percent to almost 7 percent of GDP,
and from 3.2 percent to 4.5 percent of GDP.  Therefore, the effects of the 1988 Reform in terms
of decentralization of revenues were more concentrated on subnational governments.
                                                       
48 With the exception of 1986, when they increased as result of the Cruzado Plan.41
Table A1
Brazil: Total Revenues by Government Level, 1985-97
(In percent of GDP)






1985 9.3 7.0 16.3 5.4 0.5 22.3
1986 9.4 8.0 17.4 6.7 0.6 24.7
1987 9.4 7.2 16.6 5.7 0.5 22.8
1988 9.2 6.4 15.6 5.5 0.6 21.7
1989 7.5 7.3 14.9 6.7 0.6 22.1
1990 10.0 9.6 19.6 7.8 0.9 28.3
1991 7.5 9.4 16.9 7.0 1.2 25.1
1992 7.3 9.6 16.9 6.6 1.0 24.5
1993 7.6 10.2 17.8 6.2 0.8 24.8
1994 7.0 12.8 19.9 7.5 1.0 28.3
1995 7.6 11.7 19.3 7.7 1.3 28.4
1996 7.1 11.9 19.0 7.7 1.2 28.0
1997 7.4 12.0 19.4 7.5 1.3 28.1
Avg. 85-89 8.9 7.2 16.2 6.0 0.6 22.7
Avg. 90-97 7.7 10.9 18.6 7.3 1.1 27.0
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Table A2
Brazil: Share of Each Government Level  in Total Revenues, 1985-97
(In percent)






1985 41.7 31.6 73.3 24.4 2.4 100.0
1986 38.0 32.6 70.5 27.2 2.3 100.0
1987 41.1 31.5 72.6 25.0 2.4 100.0
1988 42.4 29.7 72.0 25.4 2.6 100.0
1989 33.9 33.2 67.1 30.3 2.6 100.0
1990 35.3 33.9 69.3 27.6 3.2 100.0
1991 29.9 37.2 67.2 28.0 4.9 100.0
1992 29.7 39.3 69.0 27.0 4.0 100.0
1993 30.7 41.0 71.8 24.9 3.3 100.0
1994 24.9 45.3 70.2 26.4 3.4 100.0
1995 26.8 41.3 68.1 27.3 4.6 100.0
1996 25.4 42.6 68.0 27.6 4.4 100.0
1997 26.3 42.5 68.8 26.7 4.5 100.0
Avg. 85-89 39.4 31.7 71.1 26.4 2.4 100.0
Avg. 90-97 28.6 40.4 69.0 26.9 4.0 100.0
Source: Ministry of Finance.42
With respect to the share of each government level on total disposable revenues
49, it is possible
to observe that the 1988 Reform did not have any major effects.  The share of the federal
government declined from 61 percent to about 57 percent of the total (Table A4).  The states’
share remained constant around 25 percent of the total.  Finally, the municipalities increased
their share from about 14 percent to almost 17 percent of total disposable revenues during 1985-
1997.
As with total revenues, the decentralization of disposable revenues was not uniformly distributed
during the period.  It was more intense during 1989-1992.  During these years, the share of the
federal government was always smaller than 60 percent, the states’ share reached 25 percent and
the municipalities’ share reached almost 19 percent of total disposable revenues.  However,
during 1993-1994 the share of the federal government rose again as a result of the increase in the
relative importance of social contributions (Tables A1 and A4).
It is possible to conclude, therefore, that the decentralization impulse of the 1988 Reform was
temporary, and in 1994 the distribution of disposable revenues was again very similar to the
distribution observed before 1988.
Table A3
Brazil: Disposable Revenues by Government Level,
1985-97




1985 14.2 5.3 2.9 22.3
1986 15.0 6.3 3.3 24.7
1987 14.3 5.4 3.0 22.8
1988 13.5 5.2 3.0 21.7
1989 12.4 5.9 3.8 22.1
1990 16.1 7.4 4.9 28.3
1991 13.9 6.6 4.7 25.1
1992 14.1 6.3 4.2 24.5
1993 14.7 6.2 3.9 24.8
1994 16.8 7.2 4.3 28.3
1995 16.0 7.5 4.9 28.4
1996 15.8 7.4 4.7 28.0
1997 16.2 7.3 4.6 28.1
Avg. 85-89 13.9 5.6 3.2 22.7
Avg. 90-97 15.5 7.0 4.5 27.0
Source: Ministry of Finance.
                                                       
49 The share of tax revenues at the disposal of each level of government is defined as: own tax revenues, plus revenue received from upper
government levels minus revenue transferred to lower government levels.43
Table A4






1985 63.5 23.6 12.9 100.0
1986 60.8 25.7 13.4 100.0
1987 62.9 23.9 13.3 100.0
1988 62.2 23.9 13.9 100.0
1989 56.1 26.6 17.3 100.0
1990 56.7 26.1 17.3 100.0
1991 55.2 26.2 18.6 100.0
1992 57.5 25.5 17.0 100.0
1993 59.2 24.9 15.9 100.0
1994 59.4 25.5 15.1 100.0
1995 56.5 26.4 17.1 100.0
1996 56.5 26.5 16.9 100.0
1997 57.6 25.9 16.5 100.0
Avg. 85-89 61.1 24.7 14.2 100.0
Avg. 90-97 57.3 25.9 16.8 100.0
Source: Ministry of Finance.
2. Revenue sharing between government levels
The increase in federal government’s disposable revenues between the second half of the 1980s
and the 1990s was motivated by an increase in federal government’s own revenues, which went
from 16.2 percent to almost 19 percent of GDP during the same period.  That increase more than
compensated the increase in constitutional transfers to the states, which almost doubled in the
same years, and the increase in transfers to municipalities (Table A5).
Similarly, states disposable revenues increased during the 1990s as a result of own revenues
which raised from 6 to 7.2 percent of GDP.  As Table A6 indicates, the increase in federal
transfers to the states was matched by an equivalent increase in states transfers to the
municipalities.  Finally, the increase in total revenues at the disposal of municipalities was
motivated by a combination of higher transfers from the states, higher own revenues and higher
transfers from the federal government (Table A7).44
The relative importance of federal transfers in state’s disposable revenues varies considerably
across Brazilian states.  In 1997 it ranged from less than 9 percent in São Paulo to almost 90
percent in the Northern states of Acre, Amapá and Roraima (Table A8).  The relative importance
of federal transfers has increased significantly over time, going from less than 20 percent of
state’s disposable income in 1985 to 25 percent in 1997.  The increase was more concentrated in
the states in the South region, where federal transfers increased  from 13 percent to more than 22
percent of disposable revenues between 1985 and 1997.
In conclusion, all government levels increased their disposable incomes between the second half
of the 1980s and the 1990s.  In the case of the states, the increase in disposable income was
accompanied by a significant increase in the relative importance of federal transfers.
Table A5
Brazil: Federal Government Disposable Revenues, 1985-97
(In percent of GDP)
Own
Revenue





1985 16.3 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.1 14.2
1986 17.4 0.7 0.5 1.2 1.2 15.0
1987 16.6 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.2 14.3
1988 15.6 0.6 0.4 1.0 1.2 13.5
1989 14.9 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.4 12.4
1990 19.6 1.1 0.7 1.7 1.8 16.1
1991 16.9 1.0 0.6 1.6 1.4 13.9
1992 16.9 1.0 0.4 1.4 1.4 14.1
1993 17.8 1.1 0.5 1.7 1.5 14.7
1994 19.9 1.1 0.7 1.7 1.3 16.8
1995 19.3 1.2 0.7 1.8 1.4 16.0
1996 19.0 1.1 0.7 1.8 1.4 15.8
1997 19.4 1.1 0.7 1.8 1.4 16.2
Avg. 85-89 16.2 0.6 0.4 1.1 1.2 13.9
Avg. 90-97 18.6 1.1 0.6 1.7 1.5 15.5
Source: Ministry of Finance.45
Table A6
Brazil: State Government Disposable Revenues, 1985-97
(In percent of GDP)
Own
Revenue





1985 5.4 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.2 5.3
1986 6.7 0.7 0.5 1.2 1.5 6.3
1987 5.7 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.3 5.4
1988 5.5 0.6 0.4 1.0 1.3 5.2
1989 6.7 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.8 5.9
1990 7.8 1.1 0.7 1.7 2.2 7.4
1991 7.0 1.0 0.6 1.6 2.0 6.6
1992 6.6 1.0 0.4 1.4 1.8 6.3
1993 6.2 1.1 0.5 1.7 1.7 6.2
1994 7.5 1.1 0.7 1.7 2.0 7.2
1995 7.7 1.2 0.7 1.8 2.1 7.5
1996 7.7 1.1 0.7 1.8 2.1 7.4
1997 7.3 1.1 0.7 1.8 2.0 7.1
Avg. 85-89 6.0 0.6 0.4 1.1 1.4 5.6
Avg. 90-97 7.2 1.1 0.6 1.7 2.0 6.9
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Table A7
Brazil: Municipalities Disposable Revenues, 1985-97
(In percent of GDP)





1985 0.5 1.1 1.2 2.9
1986 0.6 1.2 1.5 3.3
1987 0.5 1.2 1.3 3.0
1988 0.6 1.2 1.3 3.0
1989 0.6 1.4 1.8 3.8
1990 0.9 1.8 2.2 4.9
1991 1.2 1.4 2.0 4.7
1992 1.0 1.4 1.8 4.2
1993 0.8 1.5 1.7 3.9
1994 1.0 1.3 2.0 4.3
1995 1.3 1.4 2.1 4.9
1996 1.2 1.4 2.1 4.7
1997 1.3 1.4 2.0 4.6
Avg. 85-89 0.6 1.2 1.4 3.2
Avg. 90-97 1.1 1.5 2.0 4.5
Source:Ministry of Finance.46
Table A8
Brazil: Federal Transfers as a Share of States Disposable Revenues
1985 1991 1997
 States Constitutional Others Total Constitutional Others Total Constitutional Others Total
 Acre 79.1 9.2 88.3 88.4 0.1 88.5 86.1 3.3 89.4
 Alagoas 32.3 13.2 45.5 53.4 7.1 60.5 54.4 5.9 60.3
 Amapá - - - 78.9 3.2 82.1 86.3 3.0 89.3
 Amazonas 25.9 23.4 49.3 23.7 5.2 28.9 22.0 5.6 27.6
 Bahia 19.3 4.4 23.7 28.0 7.1 35.1 28.9 7.3 36.2
 Ceará 40.8 7.0 47.8 42.0 4.5 46.5 40.9 4.8 45.7
 Distrito Federal 1.8 7.3 9.1 5.1 19.4 24.5 6.0 12.7 18.7
 Espírito Santo 12.1 3.8 15.9 11.1 13.6 24.7 10.6 9.7 20.3
 Goiás 12.7 3.2 16.0 12.1 5.1 17.1 18.4 5.9 24.3
 Maranhão 50.6 18.9 69.5 63.6 7.4 71.0 65.0 6.4 71.4
 Mato Grosso 21.7 4.8 26.5 25.6 9.9 35.5 22.0 7.5 29.5
 Mato Grosso do Sul 12.1 2.7 14.8 13.2 4.5 17.6 18.8 6.0 24.9
 Minas Gerais 9.5 11.3 20.9 7.4 14.0 21.5 8.4 11.8 20.3
 Pará 41.6 5.4 47.0 35.6 10.3 45.9 46.2 11.1 57.3
 Paraíba 50.7 3.2 53.9 55.3 4.7 60.0 53.4 3.9 57.3
 Paraná 4.1 2.9 7.0 6.9 6.4 13.3 10.1 12.4 22.5
 Pernambuco 27.1 7.4 34.5 31.2 7.3 38.5 33.0 6.3 39.3
 Piauí 53.2 13.4 66.6 62.4 3.6 66.0 62.3 3.6 65.9
 Rio de Janeiro 4.7 10.9 15.6 2.5 10.7 13.2 3.1 12.7 15.7
 Rio Grande do Norte 44.4 18.5 62.9 56.7 4.9 61.6 51.1 4.4 55.5
 Rio Grande do Sul 4.3 13.7 18.0 5.2 14.1 19.2 6.0 16.4 22.5
 Rondônia - - - 29.8 37.0 66.8 40.1 2.6 42.7
 Roraima 108.5 0.6 109.2 89.7 7.9 97.6 84.9 2.3 87.2
 Santa Catarina 5.9 5.0 10.9 6.5 13.0 19.5 6.6 15.6 22.1
 São Paulo 0.6 7.9 8.5 0.5 6.5 7.0 0.5 8.1 8.6
 Sergipe 47.0 15.1 62.2 59.3 4.2 63.4 57.7 3.7 61.4
 Tocantins - - - 76.5 2.1 78.6 77.9 0.3 78.2
 TOTAL 11.0 8.7 19.7 14.0 8.9 22.9 15.8 9.1 25.0
 Memorandum items:
 Mid-West Region 11.6 4.4 16.0 12.8 9.8 22.7 15.1 8.5 23.6
 North Region 39.3 12.6 51.8 44.3 11.1 55.5 51.8 5.4 57.3
 Northeast Region 33.6 9.0 42.6 42.9 6.1 49.0 43.2 5.7 48.9
 South Region 4.6 8.5 13.1 6.1 10.9 17.0 7.5 14.9 22.4
 Southeast Region 3.3 8.9 12.2 2.5 8.8 11.3 2.7 9.5 12.2
Source: Ministry of Finance.47
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